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on March 23,

crash caused by an
due her under her
to present her claim to

to the District Court. and the

amount

a

finally received the

5

date), following this

s

213

on

15 ).

bad

That Farmers

and

denied or withheld payment;

2. That her claim was not fairly debatable;

3. That Farmers' denial or failure to pay was not the result of a good faith
mistake; and
4. The resulting harm to Cedillo was not fully compensable by the UIM contract
damages awarded by the Arbitrator.

Robinson v. State Farm A:fut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 176 45 P.3d 829, 832 (2002).
Cedillo appeals from the District Court's ruling which allowed Farmers to withhold
~~,HVUL"

claimed as privileged; from the District Court's ruling granting summary judgment to
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IL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Idaho Supreme Court. In the

appeal is
See.

V.

remanded to the District Court

15).

proceedings on Cedillo 's bad faith
District Court granted Farmers'

discovery and
on

154,345 P.3d 213

now appeals the District Court's

bad faith

the

to

Appendix.
filed
electronically

prior appeal

No. CV-2013-8697).

41

).

(Ada

As such, the Clerk's Record in this appeal (No. 43890) now

includes tlie Augmented Clerk's Record in the prior appeal (No. 41638), which consists of pages
1-679; the Clerk's Record in this appeal (No. 43890), which consists of pages 1-2337; the
Supplemental Clerk's Record in this appeal (No. 43890), which consists of pages 1-27; and the
Sealed Documents.
For citation and reference the Augmented Clerk's Record in the prior appeal (No. 41638)
will be identified as "Farmers R., p
be identified as "R., p.

" and the Clerk's Record in this appeal (No. 43890) will

" or "Sup. R., p.

"
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to
!)()

was

for

valuation

claim.

On February 10, 2012, the parties appointed l\,fr Merlyn Clark as Arbitrator in this
was asked to resolve

matter

crash of May
On

L 201

Cedillo 's

s

bodily injuries suffered by
Farmers R .. p. 60 L
, Jon Steele ("Steele''), provided his Notice

Disclosure to Farmers and to Arbitrator Clark. Farmers R., pp. 605-607.
hearing was held on November 20-2 L
treating physicians: Dr.
surgery on

D.C.:

12. Cedillo ·s witnesses included
Thomas

orthopedic
\1. Little, a

s

perfo1med two surgeries on
Each

Cedillo' s treating physicians appeared

videotaped testimony

videotaped testimony.

The

Dr. Price, D.C., Dr. Goodwin and Dr. Little is found in the Clerk's

Record at R. p 2031.
Farmers' defense included the boilerplate insurance company defenses of pre-existing
condition and/or aggravation of a preexisting condition requiring, if proven, apportionment of
Cedilla's medical expenses. Farmers R., p. 44, 52, and 57. For that reason Cedilla's treating
physicians provided medical testimony that refuted Fanners' pre-existing and/or aggravation of
pre-existing condition defenses. Farmers R., p. 39, 47, 48, 49, 52, and 57.
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wage

was

had this to

a.

explicitly and

rejecting Dr. Wilson's

Dr. \Vilson's testimony. according to
upon speculation." Farmer R., p. 52.

was ·• ... based

Dr. \Vil son's testimony " ... was not supported
evidence.'' Fanners R" p. 52,
C.

The Arbitrator'' ... does not accept the

the medical

Dr.

testimony·

lil

not

a.

b.

Dr. Williams' opinion was based on
49, 142.
Clark had this to say

a.

,,

rejecting Ms. Purvis'

testimony:

Ms. Purvis did not quantify any amount of lost income.
Farmers R., p. 59.

b. Ms. Purvis' opinions concerning Cedilla's wage loss was" ... not based
on or supported by the relevant evidence." Farmers R., p. 59.
c. The Arbitrator found" ... no evidence to support any claim that Cedillo
failed to mitigate her loss of income ... " Farmers R., p. 58.
The only medical issues on which Farmers received a favorable ruling from the
Arbitrator was his decision disallowing $12,523.
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50

of Cedillo' s medical expenses, and the

medical

determined
to recover $ 12 1

expenses. was

$ 135,000.Go in

to recover $13

(Fam1ers R __ p. 57-59). for a total
a\varded Cedillo $1

()().

()/)

economic damages.

00 ·

m

The

damages for a total interim award

m

1)1)

(Farmers R., pp. 65-78).

On April 29, 2013, Arbitrator Clark issued

of S l

the

13 was

29.

A

95

Farmers R .. p. 77.
During the arbitration proceedings, Farmers

challenged

award of prejudgment

interest by its contention that Cedillo should be required to file a new proof of loss for each
surgery, which would change the starting date for the accrnal of interest, resulting in significantly
less prejudgment interest. Farmers R., p. 73. Arbitrator Clark rejected this argument as ''[n]o
such requirement is imposed by law or the insurance contract that was issued to [Cedillo] and
there is no public policy reason why a new proof of loss should be required for each new medical
procedure received by [Cedillo]." Farmers R .. p. 73.
Farmers' next challenge to the Arbitrator's award of$ l 03,468.
was its claim that Cedillo was entitled to no more than $3,991.
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79

41

as prejudgment interest

as prejudgment interest.

on

Farmers

s. l

prejudgment

1.)).
.. - 46 t0 $".)),,
- 719 .16•

on

30,2013.

vvas flatly rejected. Farmers R .. pp. 495, 523

filed its second

Arbitrator Clark· s

for reconsideration and for

prejudgment

Farmers R., po. 570-

fifth time, Arbitrator Clark rejected Fanners'

Farmers R., pp.

U I:\!!

issued
and

to

Set

Clark's
The first
four written decisions is the Arbitrator's
A.Hard issued on
12
of
for economic and
January 16, 2013. The
noneconomic damages was then subject to adjustment for payments that had
been made to Cedillo and for prejudgment interest. _ _ _ _ __
Cedillo and Farmers then submitted briefing to the Arbitrator concerning
adjustment for payments that had been made to Cedillo and for the method to
be used for the calculation of prejudgment interest. R .. p. 66; Farmers R .. pp.
65-77.
3. The Arbitrator's second written opinion is the Arbitrator's Final Award issued
on April 29, 2013. The Final Award adjusted the Interim Award for payments
that had been received by Cedillo and confirmed that Farmers still Cedillo
95
damages in the principle amount of $100,332. , plus prejudgment interest in
46
the amount of $103,135. , and that these amounts had been properly
calculated under the applicable law and facts as applied by the Arbitrator.
Farmers R., p. 65-77.

Page 6

lS

a

Farmers then, on May 20, 2013, submitted its Motion for Reconsideration of
Prejudgment Interest Award in which it sought reduction of the prejudgment
and
interest award of $103,135. 46 to $35,719. 16 .
The Arbitrator found that Farmers' motion was not
made under
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B). Farmers R., p. 551. However, it was timely under
Idaho Code§ 7-909, which requires that an application to modify or correct an
award must be brought within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to
the applicant. Farmers R., p. 552.
6. The Arbitrator's third written decision, Arbitrator's Final Order No. 12 RE:
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and
Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent and the
Amended Final Award was issued on July 24, 2013. Farmers R., p. 562.
7. Farmers then, on July 30, 2013, filed in the arbitration its second motion for
reconsideration of Arbitrator Clark's award of prejudgment interest. Farmers
R., pp. 570-577. This was Farmers' fifth challenge to the Arbitrator's award
of prejudgment interest.
8. The Arbitrator's Final Order No. 13 RE: Respondent's Application to Jvlodijj;
or Correct Amended Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration, issued
on August 21, 2013, rejected Farmers' prejudgment interest challenge
arguments for the fifth time. Farmers R., pp. 585-590.
Meanwhile, following the issuance of Arbitrator Clark's Final Award on April 29, 2013,
Cedillo had filed her PetitionfiJr Confirmation ofArbitration Award and Award ofAttorney Fees
in the District Court on May 13, 2013. Farmers R. 1 pp. 6-88.
On August 16, 2013, Cedillo filed her First Amended Petition .fiJr Confirmation of

Arbitration Award, Award <~{Attorney Fees, Unenforceability <~l Offset Clause and Bad Faith
(hereatter "First Amended Petition"), which was served on Farmers on August 16, 2013. On
August 20, 2013, Cedillo's first set of discovery, which consisted of interrogatories, requests for
production of documents, and requests for admission, was served on Farmers. (Farmers R. pp.
27-59). Pursuant to LR.C.P. 33(a) (2), 34 (b) (2), and 36 (a), Farmers discovery responses were
due on September 19, 2013.
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8, 201

Farmers filed

the District Court its Motion for Modffication
to

for the sixth time,

Clark's award of

prejudgment interest.
On September 11, 2013, Farmers made a fourth voluntary payment of $101,947. 96 but
also made the vexatious threat to seek repayment of this amount. Farmers R .. p. 658.
While the District Court was addressing the issues regarding the arbitration award, the
parties were engaged in discovery related to the bad faith issues.

On November 25, 2013,

Cedillo filed her Motion to Compel with supporting documentation (R. p. 20), consisting of
copies of the discovery requests at issue, along with copies of four discovery letters sent to
Farmers' counsel.
In her first discovery letter (dated August 29, 2013), Cedillo gave Farmers an extension
to provide discovery responses until October 15, 2013. R. p. 60. The second discovery letter
(dated October 23, 2013) requested outstanding discovery responses be provided no later than
November 18, 2013. R. p. 61.
On November 9, 2013, District Judge Norton issued the court's Memorandum Decision
and Order on Motions on Arbitration Award.

The District Court's decision confirmed the

arbitration award and awarded Cedillo attorney fees of $121,007. 23 . In the arbitration process
Cedillo incurred arbitration costs of $52,699. 79 . Although she sought reimbursement of these
costs from Farmers, the District Court found that costs were not recoverable under the terms of
Farmers' UIM contract.
Cedillo's third discovery letter (dated November 11, 2013), agam requested Farmers'
responses to her outstanding discovery. R.p. 62. Cedillo's fourth letter (dated November 13,
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20 l

discussed a phone call between Cedillo's and Farmers counsel, in which objections were
no

November

13.

once again failed to

Cedillo with any

responses. Three days later, on November 25, 2013, Cedillo filed her Motion to Compel.

~

20. Cedillo's Motion to Compel was scheduled to be heard by the District Court on December
11, 2013. On December 6, 2013, Farmers provided Cedillo with its initial discovery responses.
Farmers' responses included over four thousand pages of documents and a privilege log listing
many additional pages of documents which were claimed as privileged and were withheld from
Farmers' production.
Judgment in the amount of $126,478. 01 was entered on December 11, 2013.

On that

same day, December 11, 2013 (the day of the hearing on Cedillo's ~Motion to Compel), Farmers
filed its Notice of Appeal. Farmers R., pp. 663-666. . The District Court then entered its stay
until remittitur was received from the Idaho Supreme Court. Farmers R., p. 668-669.
The court's Judgment of $126,478. 01 , consisted of $5,608. 30 as the unpaid balance of the
Adjusted Interim Award, attorney fees of $121,007.23, and $132.

48

as interest through November

22, 2013. Farmers R., pp. 660-661.
On appeal, Farmers challenged, for the seventh time Arbitrator Clark's award of
prejudgment interest. On March 5, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court, in a unanimous 5-0 decision,
affirmed the District Court's confirmation of the arbitration, affirmed Arbitrator Clark's award of
damages and prejudgment interest, and the District Court's award of attorney fees to Cedillo.
The Idaho Supreme Court issued its Remittitur on March 27, 2015.
Following remand, on April 7, 2015, Cedillo sent Farmers her fifth discovery letter
outlining deficiencies in Farmers' discovery responses. R. p. 199-204.
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Even

discovery

continued to be

resulting m

011

9,

011

1

In support of her Renewed Motion to Compel, Cedillo submitted the Declaration of Irving

Paul in Support of Plaint[fl's Renewed A1otion to Compel. R., pp. 380-384. Mr. Paul had served
as an expert witness in nearly one hundred bad faith cases, including cases which he was hired
by the attorneys representing Farmers in this case. As this Declaration was filed just six (6) days
prior to the hearing date, it was not considered by the District Court in its discovery opinion and
decision of July 17, 2015.

~

Yet, Mr. Paul's Declaration will assist the Court in

388.

analyzing Farmers' privilege claims and was relied upon in support of Cedillo's Motion for In

Camera Review. R., p. 395.
Mr. Paul's Declaration states that "[i]n general, in all cases I have been involved in, I

have been provided with the complete paper and electronic claims file involved, subject to
certain well defined exceptions." Mr. Paul then addresses the "major exception" to the discovery
rule requiring production of the insurer's complete paper and electronic claims file:
"8.
The maJor exception
have experienced has been the
attorney/client and work product privilege. I have generally not been
provided with records of communications between the carrier and its attorney
covering legal advice.

*

*

*

* *

In my experience the fact that an attorney labels a communication as
privileged does not make it so. Since the carrier has the responsibility for
evaluating and paying claims, and since IC 41-1329 applies to carriers, there
must be sufficient discovery to allow the trier of fact to determine what the
carrier did and did not do, and whether this conduct was consistent with the
carrier's statutory and common law obligations. In summary, then, in my
experience courts have always given me access to written or electronic
records that constitute the best evidence as to why and how the carrier made
the decisions it made. In this case I need to know how, when, and why
Farmers reached the valuations it did.

10

* *

*

*

*

seem to be issues
case as to
is entitled to documents
apparently the beginning of arbitration. In
ordered discovery for actions taking place in terms of administering the
claim, but not for actions directly related to litigation. In this case I am
informed that the arbitration was concluded on August 21, 2013, (See, Final
Order No. 13 re; Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct Amended
Final .LA\.\vard and/or l\1otion for Reconsideration). In this case the Supreme
Court has stated that it is already res judicata that Farmers had sufficient
information to determine its payment on this claim as of August 25, 2009, yet
Farmers made a payment of $155,000 on October 18, 2012, while the
arbitration process was underway. This $155,000 was voluntarily made by
Farmers , and was not the result of a court order. The decision to pay this
amount is then, by definition, a claims decision, and occurred over three
years after Farmers had sufficient information to evaluate the claim. It is
therefore necessary for me to form an opinion as to whether this admitted
delay of over three years was intentional and unreasonable. I am not a mind
reader, and the data I would look at to form this opinion would be the claims
activity during this three year interim.
Did Farmers get additional
information, and if so what was that information? Was this information
available three years earlier? Why did Farmers change from paying $25,000
to paying $180,000? The source of answers to those questions is the claims
file ... subject to redaction for non-waived, attorney/client privilege on truly
legal issues or issues of litigation strategy. I am advised that Farmers made
two additional voluntary payments, the latest of $101,947 on September 11,
2013. Again, what if anything changed? Clearly the claims process was in
full swing through late September of 2013.
12. I am further advised that as a result of the March 5, 2015, Idaho Supreme
Court decision, Farmers made several additional payments. [ need enough
data to determine if these payments were reasonable and timely under the
circumstances. R., p. 375-378.
Even without considering Mr. Paul's Declaration, the District Court was convinced that
Cedillo was entitled to an order compelling discovery. R. p. 386~394. I lowcver, the District
Court understandably found it difficult to determine what had been produced and what had not;
or what was outstanding under which discovery request, making it difficult for the District Court
to issue a specific and cogent order. R,pJ9Q.

11

could only determine that a

a

not

to

7,

l

compelling

to Compel,

the

which had been filed on November 25, 2013, and granted her Renewed Nfotion to Compel, which
had been filed on May 28, 2015. R. p. 393. The District Court Order to Compel specifically
addressed Farmers' electronically stored information ("ESI"), as Farmers' counsel had not yet
made any inquiry into whether some requested ESI existed or in what form it may have existed.
R. p. 391. The District Court ordered Farmers to identify whether any responsive ESI existed

and to the extent it existed, to disclose it, and to disclose how it was stored, no later than July 31,
2015. R. p. 391.
Although Cedilla's briefing and oral argument had addressed the specific issues of
Farmers' claims of attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, the District Court
determined that it was not yet addressing these specific issues.

R. p. 391-392.

The District

Court also stated, in response to Cedillo's argument that all objections had been waived, that
'[a]bsent instruction from the Idaho Supreme Court that late objections are waived, the Court
does not accept (Ccdillo's contention) that the Idaho discovery rules mandates late objections be
waived.'' R. p. 392. The District Court then set an additional discovery hearing for August 20,
2015, to address further issues relating to Cedillo's motions to compel. R. p. 393.
Between July 17, 2015 and the date of the follow-up hearing on August 20, 2015, Cedillo
and Farmers continued to discuss discovery issues, and further productions were made.
On July 9, 2015, Farmers produced documents which had previously been claimed as
privileged and its second privilege log.

R. p. 484.

On July 17, 2015, Farmers produced an

additional 100 pages of documents that had previously been claimed as privileged, as well as its
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third privilege log.

July

2015, Cedillo

to

her

In furtherance of the District Court's order concerning ESI, Cedillo proposed search
terms and a timeline to Farmers.

Cedillo also requested that Farmers provide her its search

methodology and method of verification.

R. p. 404.

Ifowever, there was again a dispute

regarding production of certain documents which Farmers claimed were privileged. Cedillo then
filed her Motion for In Camera Review of Documents claimed as privileged, with supporting
declaration. R. p. 395. Farmers filed a response to Cedillo's Motion for In Camera Review(~[

Documents with a copy of its fourth and most recent privilege log (the "Second Amended
Supplemental Privilege Log"), Supp. Clerk's R., pp. l 0-25.

At the same time, Farmers filed

under seal with the District Court a copy of all documents that had been withheld under claims of
privilege. Farmers also submitted to the District Court all of the documents which Farmers had
produced in redacted form and a second set of unredacted documents.
Following the District Court's in ccunera review and analysis of Farmers' withheld
documents, on September 16, 2015, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and

Order Granting in Part Cedillo 's Renewed Motion to Compel. R. pp. 490-506. This decision
ordered Farmers to produce an additional l 81 pages of documents. _&_IL:±20-506.
On October 16, 2015, Farmers filed its Motion/hr Partial Summary Judgment concerning
Cedillo's claim that the set-off clause found in Farmers insurance contract at endorsement
Ell 79i was unenforceable. R. p. 518.

On November 5, 2015, Cedillo filed her cross Motion for Summwy Judgment which
contended that Farmers' set-off clause was inapplicable as the result or Judge Gerald Schroeder's
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case

Talbot v.

987

( 1999).

on
Ill, dated November 30, 2015. However, it granted summary judgment not on the merits of

Famers' contentions but rather that Cedillo had waived this claim. R. p. 1126-1140.
On December 8, 2015, Farmers filed its A1otionfor Summary Judgment on Cedillo's bad
faith claim.

Farmers' Motion for Summmy Judgment was based exclusively on the "fairly

debatable" element of Cedillo's bad faith claim. R. p. 1145-1165.
As stated by the District Court, "[b ]ecause whether a claim is fairly debatable is a factual
issue, a Defendant can only obtain Su'mmary Judgment on this issue if there is no material
question of fact." R. p. 2294. The District Court also stated, "[t]hus, at Summary Judgment
when addressing the fairly debatable issue, the Court is determining whether there is a question
of fact about a question of fact." R. p.2301.
In support of its motion, Farmers submitted to the District Court the affidavits of Dr.
Richard Wilson, Dr. Mark Williams, and Shannon Purvis. These three defense experts are the
same exact defense experts whose arbitration testimony was entirely rejected as "based upon
speculation," whose opinions were unsupported by the evidence, based upon the "possibilities,"
and not based on or supported by the relevant evidence.
On December 24, 2015 Cedillo filed her opposition to Farmers' Motion for Summary

Judgment, which consisted of the following:
•

Cedillo' s h,:r:pert Witness Disclosure. R. p. 1892.

•

Irving "Buddy" Paul's Expert Report. R __ p. 1877-1886.

•

Deposition of Irving "Buddy" PauL fC p. 1877-1886.
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Motion to Strike.
in

•

1\:femorandum in Support (~f Plaintdf's Motion to Strike.

•

Cedillo 's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion fhr Summary
Judgment. R., p 1804-1813.

•

Declaration cif Jon 1vf Steele in Support of Plaintiff's 1\10/ion fhr Leave to
Amend Complaint to Add Claims for Punitive Damages and Negligent
Adjustment of U/Jvf Claim. R., p.1815-2302.

On January 8, 2016 the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and

Order Granting Summary Judgment on Bad Faith Claim and Allowing, in Part,
Amendment c?f the Complaint. R., p. 2280-2302.
This decision denied Cedillo's motion to amend her complaint to include punitive
damages, and granted summary judgment to Farmers on Cedillo's bad faith claim, yet allowed
Cedillo to amend her complaint to include a count of negligent adjustment of Cedillo's UIM
claim. Cedillo declined the opportunity to amend her complaint (R. p. 2303) and the District
Court entered a Final Judgment on January 22, 2016. R., p. 2312.
Cedillo filed her Notice of Appeal on January 12, 2016 (R. p. 2306), and her Amended

Not ice ofAppeal on February 22, 2016 (R. p. 23 16).
On March 16, 2016, this court issued its Order to Augment Prior Appeal No. 41683.

III.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 25, 2008, Cedillo was injured while riding as a passenger on Jon Steele's
motorcycle. The motorcycle drifted to the right and hit a concrete barrier. Cedillo later married
Steele.

Cedillo had been insured with Farmers for years and her insurance pol
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resulting
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was

to

surgeon, Dr. Little, performed a C7-Tl anterior cervical decompression and fusion. Farmers R.,

IL210n July 28, 2009, Cedillo sent Farmers her proof of loss letter stating that she had settled
her claim against Steele for his policy limits. Her proof of loss letter then demanded the policy
limits of $500,000 and asked that her claim be resolved in 30 days.
Days after receiving Cedilla's proof of loss letter, the adjuster assigned to Cedilla's
claim, Ron Ramsey ("Ramsey"), asked Farmers' attorney Thomson if Cedilla's July 28, 2009
proof of loss letter received from Cedillo was valid. R. p. 1992. On August 02, 2009, Ramsey
set the initial reserve on Cedilla's claim at $50,000.

R. p. 1992.

The next day Ramsey

increased the reserve to $73,000. R. p. 1992. Just two days later, he then reduced the reserve to
$33,000. R. p. 1992. On August 14, 2009 Farmers received Cedilla's first authorization for
release of medical records. R. p. 1992. Over the next several years Cedillo provided Farmers
additional medical releases. R. p. 1992.
To recap, on August 2, 2009, Farmers set a reserve of $50,000 on Cedillo 's UIM claim.
On the next day, August 3, 2009, Famers increased Cedilla's UIM claim reserve to $73,000. On
August 5, 2009, Farmers dropped its reserve to $33,000.
On August 27, 2009 Farmers' claim file notes that Cedillo has cooperated. R. p. 1993.
On that same day (August 27, 2009), Farmers' attorney Thomson responded to Ramsey's
inquiry that Cedilla's proof of loss letter complied with Idaho Code§ 41-1839. R. p. 1993.
Yet, for the next 5 \/2 years (untii the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the Arbitrator and the District
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that Ccdillo's proof

on March 5,

letter did not

made
Court, and to

to

On August 27, 2009 Farmers reviewed the medical records of Cedillo's surgeon, Dr.
Little, and her chiropractic doctor, Dr. Price, who both agreed that Cedillo's injury at C7-Tl was
a "new, acute" concern.

R. p. 1993.

Yet, for the next 3 Y2 years Farmers contended that

Cedilla's injury was a pre-existing condition.

Farmers ignored Cedilla's treating doctors'

opinions and sought out hired actors to contradict the medical opinions of Cedilla's treating
physicians.
On August 28, 2009, Farmers sent Cedillo a check for $25,000. 00 , even though its
reserve was set at $33,000. 00 .

The reserve on Cedilla's UIM claim was then reduced to

$8,000. 00 . R. p. 1993. Farmers' letter accompanying its check stated the check was Farmers'
valuation of Cedilla's UIM claim.

Farmers then closed Cedilla's claim file.

R. p. 1993.

Farmers closed Cedilla's file when the only medical opinions in its possession unequivocally
stated that Cedilla's injury was a "new, acute" injury, not a pre-existing condition or injury, and
not an aggravation of a preexisting injury as it alleged in its defense of Cedillo's claim. When
closed, Farmers file included Cedillo's medical expenses of over $53,000. 00 .
Farmers' policies required adjuster Ramsey to assist Cedillo and maintain contact with
her. R. p. 1994. Ramsey did the exact opposite by closing Cedillo's file.
After receiving Cedilla's letter of April 05, 2010, Farmers reopened her file. R. p. 1993.
Farmers repeatedly asked for and received additional medical releases, additional medical
records, and additional medical expenses.
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requested additional medical

expenses

July and

10.
to a medical
by Dr. Richard Wilson. R. p. 1995. On May 05, 2011, three years after the crash, Dr.
Wilson evaluated Cedillo.
On January 23, 2012, Farmers received Dr. Little's pre-surgery evaluation concerning
Cedillo's need for a second neck surgery.

R. p. 1995.

Dr. Little's pre-surgery evaluation

advised Farmers that Cedillo would need a second neck fusion.

On February 15, 2012, Dr.

Little performed a C5-C6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion. R. p. 1995. Farmers' file
notes that Cedillo had a second fusion surgery on February 12, 2012, and that she also needs a
shoulder surgery. R. p. 1995. On March 22, 2012, the reserve is increased to $100,000.

&J2:

1995. On May 22, 2012, Dr. Goodwin performed surgery on Ccdillo's right shoulder.
On October 02, 2012, Cedillo was again examined by Dr. Wilson at Farmers' request
and expense. R. p. 1995. On October 18, 2012 (16 days later), Farmers delivered to Cedillo's
attorney its check for $155,000. 00 . R. p. 1995.
Farmers' attorney Thomson, in anticipation of the arbitration hearing which was just
weeks away, then began his search for a doctor who would refute the opinions of Ccdillo's
treating physicians surgeon. R. p. 1995. Attorney Thomson also sought out a hired actor to
refute Ccdillo"s claim for lost income. R. p. l 995.
Following the arbitration hearing on January 16, 2013, Arbitrator Clark issued the

Arbitrator's Interim Award in Cedillo's favor $406.700. 12 .

Farmers'

attorney states "interest should be $3,991 or $7,884, or at worst, $40,000." R. p. 1997. On
March 22, 2013, Farmers made its third voluntary payment of $100,332.
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R. p. 1997. One of
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payable to Cedillo, Regence Blue

2

13,

Arbitrator issued

·s

Application to i\lfodify or Correct Amended Final Award and/or 1v!otion for Reconsideration,
which flatly rejected, for the fifth time, Farmers' challenge to the Arbitrator's award of
prejudgment interest.
On August 20, 2013, Farmers was served with Cedillo's First Amended Petition. Motion

to Co11firm Arbitration Aware!, and jhr an Award of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment
Interest and Ccdillo's first set of discovery.
On September 15, 2013, Farmers made its fourth voluntary payment of $101,947. 96 . R.

p. 1998.
Even though its challenge to the award of prejudgment interest had been rejected six
times by the Arbitrator, Farmers pursued its flawed interest theories and ridiculous mathematical
calculations in the District Court and this Court.

IV.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the District Court err, when, in its 1vfemorandum Decision and Order dated
September 16, 2015, it allowed Farmers to withhold documents claimed as privileged?

B.

Did the District Court err, when, in its Memorandwn Decision and Order, dated January

8, 2016, it granted Farmers Motionfor Summary Judgment on Ccdillo's bad faith claim?
C.

Did the District Court err, when, in its Memorandum Decision and Order dated January
8, 2016, it denied Cedillo's motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a claim for
punitive damages?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter of the
litigation, whether it relates to claims or defenses or is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.

I.R.C. P. 26(b) (1 ). To obtain relevant discovery from an

opposing party in the litigation, a party may serve a request for interrogatories or a request for
production of documents

I.R.C.P. 26(a), 33, and 34.

If the documents requested arc not

produced or interrogatories arc not answered, and the opposing party has been given 30 days
from the date of service to respond, the party serving the discovery request may file a motion to
compel discovery. I.R.C. P. 37(a) (2).
The court has broad discretion in determining whether or not to grant a motion to compel.

Nightingale v. Temple, 151 Idaho 347, 250 P.3r<l 755, 759 (2011). Such decisions will only be
reversed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 [daho
1

697, 701, 116 P. 3 c1 27, 31 (2005).
B.
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 56(c).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with
movmg

J

v.

llarrison, l

Idaho 86,

867 P

(1994). This

A

liberally construes the

P.2d

the party opposing

(

110

issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. City of !lalley, 119
Idaho434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at
90, 867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an clement essential to that party's case
upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d
at 1037-38; Bade!! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing
the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue for trial."

IRCP 56(e) (emphasis

added). "Creating only a slight doubt as to the facts will not defeat a summary judgment motion;
a summary judgment will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a
directed verdict would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the
facts." Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541,549,691 P.2d 787, 795 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1984). More than a slight doubt as to the facts is needed to forestall summary judgment.

Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 87 L 452 P.2d 632, 368 ( 1969). "Flimsy
or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which arc not genuine, or disputes as to
matters of form do not create genuine issues which, will preclude summary judgment." Id.

of
The

Supreme Court has said the purpose of Rule 15 is

allow the best chance for each

claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some procedural technicality; and, second, to
relegate pleadings to the li111ited role of providing parties vvith notice of the nature of the

pleader's claim and the facts that have been called into question." Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,
326, 715 P.2d 993,996 (1986) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil 2d § 1471 (1971)). Courts are to heed the mandate that leave to amend shall be freely
given. Id. (internal citations omitted).

Furthermore, "it is

I settled that, in the interest of

justice, courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend." Wickstrom v. N Idaho Coll., 111
[daho 450,453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 (1986). In addition, Idaho courts hold to the principle that
"[ijf the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a Cedillo may be a proper subject of
relict: he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits." Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). adopted in Smith v. Great Basin
Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1977).
I Iowcver, the standard of liberality provided by IRCP I 5(a) is tempered in cases where a
party seeks to amend to add a claim for punitive damages. Such cases arc instead governed by
Idaho Code § 6-1604, which requires a claimant seeking to recover punitive damages to "prove,
by clear and convincing evidence. oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by
the party against whom the claim for punitive damages is asserted." Idaho Code§ 6-1604(1).
Indeed, "[pJunitivc damages arc not favored in the law and should be awarded in only the most
unusual and compelling circumstances. Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & I!osp., 122 Idaho 47,
1190 (

"

P.A.

l,

178 P.3d. 606, 614

ss 6-1604 '

Under

"

court shall

to

court
at

a reasonable

at

sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." [d.; Idaho Code § 6-1604(2).
Furthermore, in order to prevail on a motion to add a claim for punitive damages, the
Cedillo must be able to "establish the requisite 'intersection of two factors: a bad act and a bad
state of mind.' Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 503, 95 P.3d 977, 985 (2004)
(citing Linscott v. Rainier Natl. L!fe Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980))."
Id. at 250 and 178 P.3d at 615.
Importantly, whether a party is allowed to assert a claim for punitive damages is not
based upon the type of case or claim. Todd v. Sullivan Const. LLC, 191 P.3d 196, 201 (Idaho
2008). "A prayer for punitive damages is not a stand-alone cause of action, but flows from an
underlying cause of action, such as breach of contract or a tort, when the conduct of a party
meets the threshold level of being oppressive and outrageous." Boise Tovver Assoc\· .. Ll,C v.

Washington Cap. Joint Afaster Trust, 2006 WL 1749656, * 12 (D. Idaho 2006).

Vl.

A.
Cedillo's claim for bad faith turns on whether Farmers handled her UIM claim

good

faith, including the investigation and evaluation of her claim, the value of her claim, the
settlement decisions (if any), and the defense of her U!M claim in arbitration. As a consequence,
the production of all documents, communications. papers, and things called for in Cedillo· s
that bear on

Farmers
Page

of

at

arc not

arc

to Ccdillo's

and arc not

8,

in
Renewed Motion

lo

Compel.

As an insurance company, Farmers is in a supcnor position and understands the
important financial consequences of failing to fulfill its contractual duties to its insured. Sec

White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 98, 730 P .2d l O14, 1018-19 ([daho 1986). In
first-party insurance situations the "contract and the nature of the relationship give the insurer an
almost adjudicatory responsibility." Id.

The insurer is responsible for evaluating the claim,

determining whether the claim falls within the coverage provided, and determines whether to
settle or litigate based on the merits. Id. "Although the insured is not without remedies if he
disagrees with the insurer, the very invocation of those remedies detracts significantly from the
protection or security which was the object of the transaction." Id ..
This case presents the Court critically important issues that need to be resolved. Idaho
courts, litigants and attorneys arc entitled to know the rules that district courts will apply to
discovery litigation.
The first issue to be resolved is whether under the facts of this case and the discovery
rules may a district court, acting within its discretion, conclude that late discovery objections and
privileges arc waived?
The second issue to be resolved, is will this Court adopt the reasoning and conclusions of
the Washington Supreme Court in the bad faith case of Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company

Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239(2013).

ol

discovery is often the key to the unanswered questions

111

litigation.

Cedillo contends that

Farmers, as a result of its untimely and deficient responses, has waived any and all objections to
Cedillo's discovery. Cedillo repeatedly advised Farmers of the deficiencies in its responses to
Cedillo's discovery.

Cedillo requests that this Court conclude that Farmers has waved any

objection or privilege claim and that the Court order that Farmers respond without objection or
privilege claim with all information responsive to each discovery request.
In its Memorandum Decision of July 17, 2015, the District Court states that "[a]bscnt
instruction from the Idaho Supreme Court that late objections are waived, the court docs not
accept that the Idaho discovery rules mandates late objections be waived." Cedillo requests that
the Court instruct the District Court, that in this case, Farmers' late objections and privilege
claims have been waived.
[t

is well-established in the Ninth Circuit that any objections to a discovery request arc

waived if not made in the time allotted by the rules.

Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling

Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (objections to discovery requests and

interrogatories based upon China's state secrecy laws, first raised seven months after the requests
and interrogatories were served, had been waived; "[i Jt is well established that a failure to object
to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection"); Davis v.
Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) ("in the absence of an extension of time or good

cause, the failure to object to interrogatories within the time fixed by Ruic 33, F.R.Civ.P.,
constitutes a waiver of any objection. This is true even

an objection that the information

sought is

states " ... [alny

F

not

a

cause, excuses

Cedillo is not requesting

the Court state a bright line rule. Rather, the Court should

provide the District Court with discretion and enumerate the factors to be considered by the
District Court in deciding this type of discovery dispute. Cedillo believes that the facts of this
case can only lead the Court to conclude that Farmers objections have been waived.

2.

Farmers failed to substantiate its privilege claims.

Even if considered timely, Farmers has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish
its claims of privilege.

I.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A) "Privileged Information Withheld" provides the

following:
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by
claiming it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the
party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of documents,
communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to
assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.
The burden is on Farmers to demonstrate how each document or communication is
privileged. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 704 P.2d (2005); Naviganl Consulting Inc.
220 F.R.D. 467, 473 (N.I). Tex. 2004). A general allegation of privilege is insufficient to meet
this burden. Id. Instead, a clear showing must be made which sets forth the items or categories
objected to and the reasons

that objection. Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 256 P.3d

755 (2011) (document in question was clearly intended to be privileged).
Farmers' privilege log of December 6, 2013 failed to provide any facts that could have
assisted the District Court in determining whether any privilege exists.
an in camera

Although a more

failed to

of the

state

reasons
, 1212

an in camera

was

appropriate but only if Farmers had submitted detailed affidavits or other evidence supporting its
privilege claims in a timely fashion.
Significantly, Farmers has not shown how the attorney-client or work product privilege
applies to any of the documents withheld. Instead, Farmers offered only its Privilege Log dated
December 6, 2016, and its blanket assertion by its attorney that these papers were privileged.
Farmers provided no details surrounding its investigation and handling of Cedillo's claim and,
therefore, no facts on which its claim of privilege were based.
Instead, Farmers merely assumed that documents relating to its handling of Ccdillo's
claim arc protected from disclosure. Such a categorical approach to privilege issues is improper.

Ex: Parle Niday, 15 Idaho 559, 98 P. 845 (1908); Navigant Consulting, 220 F.R.D. at 474.
A proper privilege log would include the identity and position of the person who authored
the document, the date, the nature of the document, the recipient of the document, and all
information other than the actual content so that the objection or privilege claim may be
evaluated by the court.
This lack of proof alone justifies denial of Farrhers· privilege claims. Without evidence
explaining the documents and how the infcmnation contained therein is confidential and
communicated for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the Court is left with no option but to
order the production of all documents. communications, papers. and things related to Cedillo ·s

UIM claim.

9

states

following:
[f any document, information or data of any kind pertaining to the Claim, the

clain1s-hand!ing or under\vriting activities, or any reports, con11nunications, or
data of any kind, arc maintained on any electronic media, such as computer
data files, electronic mail, or any equivalent, identify the contents of such
electronically-stored information, the location, and whether or not hard copies
of such material exist.
Farmers' Answer to Interrogatory No. 9 states the following:
Attachment Nos. 1-9 were maintained electronically. A hard copy of
Attachment No. l O exists anct would have been in Cedillo's possession. I lard
copies of Attachment Nos. 1 through 9 have been made in order to respond to
Cedillo's discovery. Hard copies of any portions of the electronic file would
not have been made except to provide copies of such things as medical
records to UIM defense counselor experts.
Farmers' Answer to Ccdillo's [nterrogatory No. 9 docs not include an objection.
Farmers took it upon itself to determine what ESI was responsive to Ccdillo's discovery.
The rules governing the compilation and the production of ESI require Farmers to identify its IT
infrastructure and storage devices, key players and custodians, and the locations of all
information relevant to this litigation. Cedillo is entitled to confirmation of Farmers' spoliation
and preservation efforts, Cedillo is entitled to participate in the selection of the time frame,
scope, and list of search terms used by Farmers for searching, harvesting, and processing its ESI,
and

is also entitled to know what quality control or quality assurance, or verification

measures, were taken by Farmers to ensure the precision and reasonableness of Farmers' search
and

effr)rts.
has failed to comply with discovery request and I.R.C.P. 34(a) and 34(b).

Cedillo requests the Court order Farmers to answer Cedilla's ES[ discovery request m
[.

and 34(b).

or protected.

claims adjustor Ramsey arc not

Farmers' Privilege Log lists papers prepared by its claims adjuster Ramsey. There is no
basis for Farmers to claim these papers as privileged. "[C]ourts have routinely recognized that
the investigation and evaluation of claims is part of the regular, ordinary, and principal business
of insurance companies.'· Piatkowski v. Abdon Callais qff,shore, LLC, No. Civ. A. 99-3759,
2000 WL 1145825 at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 2000). "[E]ven though litigation is pending or may
eventually ensue does not cloak such routinely generated documents with work product
protection."

Piarkowski, 2000 WL 1145825 at*2, and Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.

Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
Additionally, because an insurance company's normal course of business includes
investigating and evaluating claims on its contracts, courts hold that documents constituting any
part of a factual inquiry into or evaluation of a claim, undertaken in order to arrive at a claim
decision, arc prepared in the ordinary course of an insurer's business and arc therefore not work
product. An insurance company cannot reasonably argue that its claim files arc accumulated in
anticipation of litigation when it has a duty to investigate, evaluate, and make a decision with
respect to claims made on it by its insured (here, Cedillo).
Farmers should be ordered to produce the unredacted papers of claims adjuster Ramsey.

5.

arc not

or

Farmers bases its claim of privilege on the ground that Mr. Thomson is an attorney and
therefore reasons that all papers that Mr. Thomson participated in arc privileged.
'[tlhc burden of

infrmnation is privileged, and therefore, exempt

I lowever,

discovery. is on

party asserting the

,. Kirk v. Ford 1\10/or Co .. 141 [daho 697, 701, 116 P

is not
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to

a

lawyer." Divers(fied Indus. Inc v. ~Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977).
These issues have recently been addressed by the Washington Supreme Court in the case
of Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239 (2013).
The central issue in Cede!! was the application and scope of the attorney-client privilege in a
claim for insurance bad faith, the same issue now facing this Court. Cedell 's analysis of the
issues have been cited with approval by US District Court Judge B. Lynn Winmill in the case of

Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. Credit Suisse (R., p. 498) and in the case of Hilborn v.
Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Insurance Co. (R., p. 498).
In Cedell the plaintiff filed a claim with Farmers Insurance after his home burned down.
Farmers hired attorney Ryan Hall to provide coverage advice and also to investigate the claim.
Farmers delayed paying the claim, prompting Cedell to sue them for bad faith.

In discovery,

Cedell sought to compel production of communications between Farmers and its attorney Hall.
Farmers objected on the ground of privilege, claiming that attorney Hall was retained to give
legal advice on coverage issues.
The Washington Supreme Court sitting en bane, rejected Farmers' broad claim of
privilege.

The Court began its analysis by discussing what information the insured needs in

order to pursue his bad faith action:
The insured needs access to the insurer's file maintained for the insured in order
to discover facts to support a claim of bad faith. [mplicit in an insurance
company's handling of claims is litigation or the threat of litigation that involves
the advice of counsel. To permit a blanket privilege in an insurance bad faith
claim because of the participation of lawyers hired or employed by insurers would

Pauc
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unreasonab Iy

presumptively, the

claims file.

specifically, "[ w]e start from

presumption that there is no attorney-client privilege relevant between the insured and the insurer

in the c!airns adjusting process ... " ~rhe insurer n1ay overco1nc the prcsu1nption of discovcrability
by showing that "its attorney was not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and
evaluating or processing the claim, but was instead providing the insurer with counsel as to its
own potential liability; fi.)r example, whether or not coverage exists under the law." "Upon such
a showing, the insurance company is entitled to the redaction of communications from counsel
that reflected the mental impressions of the attorney to the insurance company, unless those
mental impressions are directly at issue in their quasi-fiduciary responsibilities to their insured."
In this case,

Farmers has made no attempt to overcome the presumption of

discovcrability. The Court file is devoid of any facts justifying Farmers' privilege claims, and in
this case the mental impressions of Farmers' attorney, Mr. Thomson, arc directly at issue.
In its Response to Ccdillo's Request for Admission No. 138, Farmers denies that attorney
Thomson was hired to provide coverage advice. R .. pp. 291. 756. This admission alone, if not
conclusive, is a factor for the Court to consider that negates any claim that attorney Thomson
was engaged in a privileged capacity.
As an example of the routine claim handling work performed by attorney Thomson, the
Court is directed to attorney Thomson's letter to Cedillo, dated December 28, 20 l 0, concerning
an independent medical exam ("Ron Ramsey requested that I assist him in setting up an
independent medical exam"). IC p. 141.
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Farmers,

will point the Court to

following statement found

the

special considerations
first party
bad faith
claims, except for under insured motorist (UIM) claims, the insured is entitled to
access to the claims file ... [W]e recognize a difference between UIM bad faith
claims and other first party bad faith claims. The UIM insurer steps into the shoes
of the tortfeasor and may defend as the tortfeasor would defend. Thus, in the UIM
context, the insurance company is entitled to counsel's advice in stratcgizing the
same defenses that the tortfeasor could have asserted. However, even in a claim
alleging bad faith in handling of a UIM claim, there are limits to the insurer's
attorney-client privilege.

Id. at 245.
The limits referred to by the Washington Supreme Court are, first, a timely attorneyclient privilege claim; second, which complies with l.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A); and third, a fraud or
bad faith allegation by the insured. The Cedell Court, in footnote 4 at page 252, clarifies this
reference to fraud by its statement that ' [s]ince conduct short of fraud constitutes bad faith,
requiring a threshold showing of fraud to reach critical evidence requires too much." The Cedell
Court also states that "[i]n the context of first party insurance, bad faith may often be tantamount
to civil fraud.'' Id. at 252.
Farmers fails to fit within the UIM exception described by the Washington Supreme
Court for at least six reasons. First, Farmers' privilege claims were untimely. Second, Farmers'
privilege log fails to comply with I.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A). Third, Cedillo's allegations arc clearly
allegations of bad faith. Fourth, Cedillo has demonstrated substantial need and undue hardship
in obtaining substantially equivalent materials by other means. In other vvords, Farmers is the
one and only source of the materials sought.

Fifth, Farmers' breach of its UIM insurance

contract with Cedillo was proven at arbitration and confirmed by both the District Court and this
Court. The breach of its U

insurance contract been established and is the

of this case.

It is the " ...

's advice in strategizing the same defenses

UIM tortfcasor
s

IS

111

contract arbitration,

mental

impressions, could not compromise Farmers' defense in that case as the underlying UIM breach
of contract litigation has been concluded in Cedillo's favor. Sixth, in the underlying contractual
UIM claim which was resolved in Cedillo's favor, Farmers was " ... entitled to counsel's advice
in strategizing the same defense that the tortfeasor could have asserted ... " but in this case,
Farmers did not assert the same defense that the tortfcasor could have asserted there was never
an issue of liability or comparative negligence defense.

R., p. 143-145.

In the Arbitration

Stipulation, Farmers agreed its liability under its UIM contract was not an issue.

R., p. 145.

Farmers also agreed that comparative fault was not an issue. R., p. 145.
Farmers has also failed to establish the applicability of the work-product doctrine which
is overcome upon a showing of need. Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins., 976 F.2d
111

573, 577 (9 Cir. 1992) ("[OJpinion work product may be discovered and admitted when mental
impressions are al issue in a case and the need for the material is compelling" (emphasis in
original).

Both clements arc met in a bad faith insurance claim settlement case as the

" ... strategy, mental impressions and opinion of [the insurer's] agents concerning the handling of
the claim arc directly at issue." Id. The documents sought by Cedillo were merely the materials
ordinarily included in an insurer's claim file. See. Pete Rinaldi ·s Fast Food v. Great Amer. Ins.
Cos .. 123 F.R.D 198, 202 (M.D.N.C. 1988) ("Because an insurance company has a duty in the
ordinary course of business to investigate and evaluate claims made by its insured, the claims
files containing such documents usually cannot be entitled to work product protection.'}

There is no other way for

this information as it is

to

v. Houston

Farmers.
17, 2011)

that

existed for producing

in the

11
product

case where information was in "exclusive control'' of insurer and insured had "no other way to
probe reasons [insurer] denied [the insurcd's] claim").
B.

The District Court Erred When It Awarded Summary Judgment to Farmers on the
"Fairlv Debatable" Issue.
The third issue to be resolved by this Court is what constitutes the required bad faith

element of "fairly debatable."
In relation to the issue of whether a claim is fairly debatable, "an insurer does not act in
bad faith if it declines to pay sums that arc reasonably in dispute. Lucas v. Stale Farm Fire &

Gas. Co., 13 l Idaho 674, 677, 963 P.2d 357, 360 (1998)." Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC
v. Hartfhrd Fire Ins. Ca., 153 [daho 716, 721, 291 P.3d 399,404 (2012). "Rather, a claim for
bad faith arises only where an insurer intentionally denies or delays payment, even though the
insured's claim is not fairly debatable. Robinson, 137 Idaho at 176-77, 45 P.3d at 832-33 (citing

Anderson, 130 Idaho at 759,947 P.2d at 1007)." Id. at 721-22, 291 P.3d at 404-405.
Thus, "an insurer docs not act in bad faith if it challenges the validity of a 'fairly
debatable' claim or when the delay results from honest mistakes." Roper v. State Farm Mui.

Auto. Ins. Co., 131 [daho 459, 461, 958 P.2d 1145, 114 7 ( 1998) (citing White v. Unigard

1\,fut.

Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 100, 730 P.2d. 1014, 1020 (1986)); sec also Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co.
c~fidaho, 130 Idaho 755,759,947 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1997) ("Good faith and fair dealing with an
insured docs not include the payment of sums that arc reasonably in dispute, but only the
payment of legitimate damages.''). "Therefore, if payment of the bills is reasonably in dispute,

an

by

msurance

as to the causal
Page

between the

condition and the accident, and eventually a determination that the conditions arc not causally
to
8

create a

Roper,
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at

at 1147-48.
Farmers' 1\;fotionfiJr Summmy Judgment made the following contentions:
a. That Cedillo did not provide Farmers with the necessary information and/or produce
documents in a prompt manner with regard to her medical providers and her wage
loss claim to allow for Farmers evaluation.
b. That there was medical evidence of pre-existing injuries to Ms. Cedillo's shoulder
and neck - the same injuries she alleged were caused by the accident.
c. That legitimate questions and differences of opinion existed over the causation and
effect of Ms. Cedillo's injuries which affected the value of her claim.
Farmers contends that for these three reasons Ccdillo's claim was "fairly debatable." At

the outset, Cedillo and the Court must note that Farmers moved for summary judgment on only
one element of Cedillo's claim for bad faith: that is, that Cedillo's claim was fairly debatable.
Farmers' Motion for Summmy Judgment was a regurgitation of its speculative, improbable, and
inconsistent testimony offered in arbitration and rejected by Arbitrator Clark.
The "fairly debatable" issue is not limited to medical issues. If it were, there would be no
bad faith tort in Idaho; every insurance defense answer includes the defenses of pre-existing
condition and aggravation of pre-existing condition.

By simply including these boiler plate

defenses in its answer to a complaint has the insurer created a "fairly debatable" issue which
insulates it from a bad faith claim?
Cedillo contends the answer is no. In its defense an insurer may not fabricate issues.

Cedillo 's

issue of "fairly debatable" includes Farmers'

totality.

to
and
Arbitration.

at the

The reports / opm1on letters attached to the Affidavit of Wilson, Affzdavit of

Williams, and the Affidavit c~f Purvis were not offered as evidence in the Arbitration. Had they

been offered they would have been refused as inadmissible hearsay.
At Arbitration Farmers' "expert witnesses" presented a masterful spin of selected but
incomplete facts advancing a talc which was simply unbelievable. The Arbitrator heard the full
story and the complete factual scenario of this case, and rejected every piece of evidence and
testimony offered by Farmers. This was not a close call for the Arbitrator, as can be seen in his
decisions.
Farmers' testimony was provided by paid, biased actors. The Arbitrator had the right to,
and did, disregard the testimony of Wilson, Williams, and Purvis.
Arbitrator Clark judged Farmers' and Ccdillo's evidence upon the requirements of I.R.E.
702 and whether the scientific basis for such evidence was reliable. Arbitrator Clark found that
Farmers' "expert" witness testimony was inconsistent with the evidence offered by Ccdillo's
three (3) treating (not retained) medical experts. Farmers' "expert" witness testimony lacked any
evidentiary basis, was improbable, was pure speculation, and/or was based upon possibilities and
not evidence. Arbitrator Clark judged the weight of Farmers' and Cedillo's evidence based upon
the qualifications of the witness, the opportunity of the witness for observation and opinions, the
overall accuracy of the statements made by the witness, and the integrity of the witness and flatly
rejected every bit of testimony offered by Farmers' hired actors. Arbitrator Clark's January 16,
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13,

and complete analysis of

a

111

case

which

of

(3)

to

to a jury. In addition, the facts of this case have been reviewed by Mr. Irving "Buddy" Paul, who
has been qualified as an expert on bad faith in numerous other bad faith cases in the state of
Idaho and other states, both in federal and state courts. Mr. Paul unequivocally states that the
clements of bad faith are present in this case and that the acts and omissions of Farmers were an
extreme deviation from industry standards, were the result of malice, and constituted outrageous
conduct. R., p. 1681.
Ccdillo's expert, Mr. Paul, cites numerous examples of actions or inactions taken by
Farmers he found to be unreasonable and outrageous. Mr. Paul noted Farmers' failure to use the
medical authorizations executed by Cedillo to obtain medical records, its failure to seek objective
medical opinions, and its purposefully ignoring Cedillo's three (3) treating physicians' opinions.
Mr. Paul also found that the time it took Farmers to adjust and pay Cedillo's claim was grossly
deviant from generally accepted insurance industry's standards in the state ofldaho.
Mr. Paul's deposition testimony lists Farmers' conduct which violated insurance industry
standards as practiced in Idaho, which was self-serving, which was outrageous, malicious, which
delayed and denied amounts fairly owed to Cedillo, and which violated the Idaho Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act (Idaho Code §41-1329). R. pp. 1828-1842.
Farmers' conduct includes not only its fabricated medical issues but also its overly
zealous and unfounded assertions concernrng Cedillo 's proof of loss, its unreasonable and
unfounded prejudgment interest contentions, its accusations of collusion and its delays in paying
Cedillo the amount justly due her. .
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Farmers

been intentionally

been

to

to
security of the protection

paid

In the words of Mr. Buddy Paul, Farmers' claim file evidences lack of investigation,
outright intransigence and maliciousness, and makes it undeniably clear that Farmers had no
interest in being fair to Cedillo.
The issues raised in Farmers' Motion.for Summmy Judgment were resolved in arbitration.
The Arbitrator considered Farmers' contentions and found them to be unsupported by any
evidence.

The District Court confirmed the Arbitrator's decision.

This court affirmed the

District Court in its confirmation of the Arbitration.
In the District Court's ruling of November 30, 2015, Memorandum Decision and Order

Granting Summmy Judgment on Count III, the following is found:
"The Court begins with the issue of res judicata (i.e. was this issue dealt with as
part of binding arbitration), as it appears to be dispositive of all issues.

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment on Count Ill,
filed November 30, 2015 at p. 9 section B Res Judicata.
The District Court's cited 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments§ 519, W !dus. & Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
126 Idaho 541,544, 887 P. 2d 1048, 1051 (1994), and Idaho Code §7-914, as authority fr)r its
determination that claim preclusion barred Cedillo's claim concerning the "offset clause."
That same logic and legal authority precludes Farmers from raising the issues addressed
in its Motion.for Surnmmy Judgment. The trial of those issues is over and Farmers lost.
Farmers' UIM contract binds it to the results of the arbitration. Farmers' UIM contract
containing the arbitration clause is intended to simplify and provide a speedy, less expensive
conclusion to legitimate disputes between Farmers and its insureds. In Cedillo's case, Farmers
abused the arbitration

by unreasonable delay, unreasonable denial, and unreasonable
38

Binding arbitration, which
of witnesses, is

the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the bias
claims. Whether

to

claim was "fairly debatable" or not has been

Cedilla's favor and is not an

lSSUe.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied CediHo's Motion to Add a Punitive

Cedillo urges this Court rightfully conclude that she has established a reasonable
likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages against
Farmers, and allow her pleadings to be amended to pray for such relief The jury may ultimately
find against Cedillo, but at this point that is not the determinative issue. Idaho Code § 6-1604(2)
only requires that Cedillo present evidence that would support an award of punitive damages if
the jury determines. Mr. Paul's Expert Report, Farmers' own files, and its discovery responses
provide that requisite evidence.
In this publication entitled "Insurance Bad Faith," The Honorable D. Duff McKee, a
senior judge in the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho, said the following about the appropriateness
of punitive damages in a bad faith case:
" ... conduct that is not only indifferent but is also calculated to work to the
in addition,
advantage of the insurer elevates the circumstances considerably.
the insured is placed at a special disadvantage by the indifferent conduct, and the
insurer is made aware of the disadvantage and still persists, the circumstances arc
elevated even further.

u:

In assessing a potential claim for punitive damages, a determination in
favor of alleging punitive damages ordinarily will require the presence of the
following circumstances:
(a)
(b)
(c)

The conduct under examination breached a duty owed;
As a result of the breach, the position of the insurer was advanced at the
expense of its insured;
The insured was harmed or placed at a disadvantage by the conduct, of
which the insurer was aware

( d)

The circumstances demonstrate an egregious breach, under the standards
applicable for punitive damages.

A common example of cases in which punitive damages may be
involves
delay in payment of the loss. The insurer is entitled to a "reasonable" time to
determine and pay losses due. However, if it takes an excessive amount of time,
it has breached its duty. Delay in payment works to the advantage of the insurer;
this is elementary economics. ff the insured has been forced to forgo an
opportunity or endure a hardship during this interim, the delay works to the
disadvantage of the insured, and if the insurer is or should be aware of this harm,
conditions (a), (b), and (c) satisfied.
The final test, ( d), is one of common sense. Taken as a whole, are the
circumstances such as to constitute an outrageous affront to the sensibilities of the
ordinary person? In answering this question, the adjectives embedded within the
punitive damage standards are instructive: "extreme" deviation, "reckless" disregard,
"callous" indifference, "gross" negligence, and the like.
18 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, 323 at 327
1.

Cedillo's expert testimony concerning punitive damages.

In support of Cedilla's motion to add claim for punitive damages, Cedillo relied upon the
expert report submitted by Mr. Paul. R. pp. 1877-1886. Mr. Paul cites numerous examples of
Farmers' failure to timely adjust Cedilla's claim. Such examples include, but are not limited to,
the following:
Mr. Paul's Expert Report unequivocally establishes that Farmers' course of conduct with
respect to handling and processing Cedilla's claim was oppressive, fraudulent, malicious, and
outrageous. Mr. Paul's Expert Report established that there is a reasonable likelihood of proving
facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.

2.

Farmers' unreasonable conduct cause harm to Cedillo.

The damages suffered by Cedillo as a result of Farmers' material breach of its insurance
contract will be more particularly proven at the time of trial and include, but are not limited to,
the following:
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(1)

$34,150.

Arbitration costs:

$1

determined by

Bad

To be determined by Jury.

(4)

Punitive damages:

3.

There is a special relationship between Farmers and Cedillo.

Our Supreme Court identified the relationship between an insured and msurance as
special, a quasi-fiduciary relationship. The delay or denial of payments is the heart of bad faith.

White v. Unigard 1vfut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho, 94 730 P.2d 1014 (1986); Robinson v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173 45 P.3d 829 (2002). That is what bad faith is all about. In
this case, the denial and delay commenced on July 28, 2009 (the Proof of Loss date) and
continued to March 5, 2015. In both Inland Group v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 135
Idaho 249 258, 985 P.2d 674, 683 (1999), and Chester v. State Farm Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 538,
789 P.2d 534 ( 1990), the delays were only a matter of months; yet, in those cases the insurers
were held to be guilty of bad faith.
In this case, the delays are years-longer than in either Chester or Inland, and Cedillo has
confidence that a jury will find that the delays and denials were unreasonable.

4.

There is proof that Farmers continues its oppressive, outrageous conduct.

The expert report of Mr. Paul concludes that Farmers has failed to adopt and implement
reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies, a
violation of [daho Code §41-1329(3). R. p. 1901. It should be obvious that as Farmers has no
reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims that its oppressive conduct will
continue until it adopts and enforces reasonable standards.
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of
a multi-million dollar,
full knowledge of the likely consequences

conduct.

Cedillo is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code § 411839(1) and Idaho Code§ 41-2502.

,_fhe District Court a\varded Cedillo attorney fees incurred in the arbitration tinder Idaho
Code §41-1839. This Court awarded Cedillo attorney fees in the prior appeal of Farmers under
Idaho Code § 41-1839.

Cedillo reasonably expects to prevail in this appeal and is therefore

entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §41-1839 and the public
policy ofldaho Code §41-2502 requiring UIM insurance.
The legislature has mandated UIM insurance coverage. Issues concerning UIM insurance
are matters of public policy.

It will further the public policy of requiring U[M insurance

coverage to resolve the issues Cedillo brings before the Court and to award Cedillo attorney fees.

Vil.
CONCLUSION
Farmers' claim file, rather than documenting assistance to Cedillo, instead documents
Farmers' deliberate, lengthy, and extreme efforts to ignore, delay, deny, and defend against
Ccdillo's valid UIM claim. Cedillo urges this Court to order the production of Farmers' entire
claim file.
Farmers' ongoing arguments attempting to justify its conduct arc unconscionable and
outrageous. Farmers' arguments demonstrate its cavalier, reckless, outrageous, and malicious
treatment of its policyholder. Farmers' documents prove that Cedillo was severely injured, was
incurring over $100,000 in medical expenses, and that Farmers had no legitimate reason to

Page

delay,

or defend against Cedilla's UIM claim. Yet, that is

begrudgingly made payments to Cedillo, which were

what it has done for the

past due. Incredibly,

Farmers' payment of $101,947. 00 on September 11, 2013 was made with Farmers' reservation to
seek reimbursement. R. pp. 1076, 1812. This conduct contradicts Farmers' duty to never place
its own financial interests ahead of its policyholders' interests.
Farmers' conduct has been reprehensible, has been intentionally indifferent to and
completely in disregard of its promises to faithfully provide Cedillo with the comfort and
security of the protection she paid for.
In the words of Mr. Buddy Paul, Farmers' claim file evidences lack of investigation,
outright intransigence and maliciousness, and makes it undeniably clear that Farmers had no
interest in being fair to Cedillo. R. p. 1897-1901. The District Court erred in granting Farmers'
summary judgment and should be reversed. As the record clearly proves, Cedillo is also entitled
to amend her complaint to include a punitive damage claim. Cedillo is also entitled to an award
of attorney fees.

DATED this

day of August 2016.
RUN FT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorney for Respondent
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_ _ day of August, 2016 I caused to
correct copy of the foregoing
BRlEF in the
method indicated below and addressed to the following:

Jack Gjording
Julianne Hall
Gjording & rouser, PLLC
121 N. 9th St., Suite 600
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, [0 83 70 l

a true and
matter
the

Via Facsimile
- - Via Personal Delivery
- - Via U.S. Mail
Via E-mail
---

Attorney/hr Farmers Insurance Company
Ofldaho

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFF[CES, PLLC

By:_~~'---+JON M. stE
Attorney for Cedillo-Appellant
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